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Abstract
The purpose of this Essay is to examine the establishment of the Yugoslav Truth and Reconcil-
iation Commission and to draw some early conclusions on whether it will be capable of rendering
the facts that I would so desperately like my uncle to face. The first part will deal with the need for
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, while the second part will outline and then comment on
its basic documents. The assumption is that the reader is basically familiar with the work of similar
commissions around the world and the text will therefore not attempt to repeat the literature on the
subject.
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INTRODUCTION
For many years now I have hardly spoken to one of my un-
cles. We parted ways after a series of heated discussions on the
causes and course of the tragedy that was, at the time, unfolding
in the former Yugoslavia. No amount of facts could convince
him: he simply denied any Serbian responsibility for the blood-
shed and destruction visited by Serbian or Serbian-sponsored
forces outside their borders and refused to believe that crimes
were being committed. When I asked him once to pick up an
opposition newspaper as proof of my arguments, he waved me
down saying he did not need to read "Western propaganda."
Time and again in our discussions I felt I was hitting a brick wall.
When, several months ago, I learned that Yugoslav President
Vojislav Kostunica had established a Yugoslav Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission ("Commission"), my uncle immediately
came to mind. Finally, I thought, he will have to hear what really
happened. Finally, he will have to come to terms with the mag-
nitude of the atrocities committed in "his" name and will have to
share the shame that I, and others like myself, have been living
with.
The purpose of this Essay is to examine the establishment of
the Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission and to draw
some early conclusions on whether it will be capable of render-
ing the facts that I would so desperately like my uncle to face.
The first part will deal with the need for a Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, while the second part will outline and then
comment on its basic documents. The assumption is that the
reader is basically familiar with the work of similar commissions
* Jelena Pejic, an international lawyer from Belgrade, currently lives and works in
Geneva. Switzerland.
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around the world and the text will therefore not attempt to re-
peat the literature on the subject.1
I. THE NEED FOR A TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
An initial question that needs to be answered is whether a
Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission is necessary
given the ongoing work of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"). Created in 1993 by the
U.N. Security Council, 2 the Tribunal has already proven to be a
formidable mechanism for dispensing justice and establishing
individual criminal responsibility for the crimes committed in
the region. Its proceedings are also finally generating more in-
terest in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY'), especially
since the surrender by Serbian authorities of former Serbian and
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.3
It is submitted that, despite its remarkable work to date and
the account of events it will produce going forward, the Tribunal
can be well complemented by a national Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission. Like any other judicial institution, the pri-
mary role of the ICTY is to establish the criminal responsibility of
individuals in legal proceedings that are regulated by fixed defi-
nitions of crimes and rules of procedure and evidence. Its aim is
to determine the specific acts committed by an accused and to
rule on whether those acts fit the legal definition of one or more
crimes over which the ICTY has jurisdiction. The political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and other contexts in which the former
Yugoslav wars were planned and carried out are examined only
to the extent that they may be of relevance to better identifying
1. See generally PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TER-
ROR AND ATROCITY (2001).
2. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827
(1993) (establishing International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
("ICTY') to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia).
3. See ICTY Outstanding Public Indictments, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/
indictlist-e.htm (updated Oct. 10, 2001) (identifying 80 indictees, of whom 49 are cur-
rently in proceedings before Tribunal with 31 remaining at large); ICTY Fact Sheet on
ICTY Proceedings, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm (updated Oct.
10, 2001) (identifying 23 defendants tried by ICTY for crimes in former Yugoslavia,
another 9 who await trial, 7 defendants who are currently being tried, and 16 who are at
pretrial stage).
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the role and responsibility of the individual in the dock. Re-
sponsibility is defined, broadly speaking, as either direct commis-
sion of a crime or as responsibility that ensues on the basis of a
person's failure to prevent or punish crimes by others which he
or she knew or should have known about.4 The political and
moral responsibility of all those who were part of the system that
allowed the crimes to happen is not, and cannot be, a part of the
Tribunal's functions. Thus, the "truth" that the Tribunal seeks
to establish is much narrower than a "big picture" rendition of
events that a national Truth and Reconciliation Commission
could presumably produce.
Furthermore, no judicial body, including the ICTY, is de-
signed to examine the entire functioning of a society with a view
to determining what power structures facilitated the commission
of crimes, and the steps that should be taken to prevent their
recurrence in the future. A Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation
Commission could, like other such commissions, recommend
legislative, judicial, administrative, policy, and practical reforms
that would aim to change the environment and eliminate the
structures that fostered impunity. Just as importantly, a national
Truth and Reconciliation Commission could suggest further
steps that would need to be taken to provide redress to victims.
While the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence do contain a
rudimentary compensation mechanism,5 the Commission could
cast the net much wider, both in terms of the victims and the
measures that would be adequate to alleviate the wrongs suf-
fered.
Another reason that a Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation
Commission is necessary lies-it must be said-in the very low
esteem in which the ICTY is held in the country. While distrust
of the Tribunal is based on nationalist feeling fed by propa-
ganda-according to which the ICTY is "anti-Serb"-it remains a
fact that the majority of Serbs do not believe in the ICTY's fair-
ness and dispute the facts it establishes.6 This perception of the
4. Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 7, available at http://www.un.org/
icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm.
5. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 106, available at http://
www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev2lcon.htm.
6. In all fairness, it must be said that the ICTY's credibility was irreparably harmed
in the eyes of the average Serb by two events: Milosevic's indictment at the height of
the NATO bombing campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") and by the
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Tribunal, no matter how erroneous, means that the public at
large is not likely to accept the record of events determined by
the Tribunal and that its truth-telling function will be even more
limited than would ordinarily be the case. If there were any
chance of reaching out to Serbs who continue to deny or refuse
to face reality, it would appear that a national Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission would be a more appropriate mechanism
for doing so. As a domestic institution, a national Commission
would obviously enjoy a much greater degree of confidence pro-
vided its composition, mandate, and methods of work were de-
termined in a consultative and transparent manner. Its credibil-
ity could be the strongest recommendation for later acceptance
of the facts and truth it would present to the public.
Depending on its mandate, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission could also provide an important impetus to domes-
tic prosecutions for crimes under international and domestic
law, a function that the ICTY cannot play for the reasons men-
tioned above. Despite increasing evidence of atrocities un-
earthed on Serbian soil,7 only two Serbian citizens have been
charged with war crimes by domestic courts to date.' The politi-
cal atmosphere in the country is such that anyone pressing for
ICTY's subsequent determination that the campaign did not warrant a war crimes inves-
tigation. The fact that Milosevic was indicted in the spring of 1999, just as NATO air-
craft were daily bombing cities across Yugoslavia inevitably made it seem as if the Tribu-
nal was being used as an additional instrument of war against the FRY. The ICTY's
refusal to then even investigate certain incidents in the air campaign, especially the
bombing of TV Belgrade (which Amnesty International called a war crime) further
cemented suspicions about the ICTY's even-handedness. See Final Report to the Prosecutor
by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia, Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 90 (June 13, 2000),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm (recommending against
investigation of NATO bombing because of insufficient evidence and lack of applicable
law); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "COLLATERAL DAMAGE" OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS?
(June 13, 2000), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/SUM/4700
1800.htm (reporting violations of laws of war by NATO during Operation Allied Force
and the decision to not investigate NATO's alleged war crimes); Andrew Osborn, New
Charges Piled on Milosevic, GUARDIAN, Oct. 10, 2001, at 19 (detailing latest indictments of
Milosevic for war crimes).
7. See Carlotta Gall, A Year Later, A Free Serbia Struggles to Overcome its Past, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2001, at A3 (describing mass graves found in Serbia, believed to contain
the bodies of massacred Albanians transported to Serbia and buried by special forces).
8. See Marina Grihoric, Regional Report: Serbia's Faltering War Crime Prosecution, INST.
FOR WAR & PEACE REP., TRIBUNAL UPDATE No. 234 (Sept. 12, 2001) (recounting Serbia's
national courts' hesitancy and inability to bring war crimes charges against suspect citi-
zens).
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war crimes prosecutions must be prepared to bear the conse-
quences in terms of loss of support and credibility. Even more
importantly, the national judicial system is still not capable of
holding war crimes trials that would conform to international
due process standards even if genuine political will for such trials
existed. The judiciary was professionally and materially devas-
tated during the Milosevic period and it will take time before it
regains confidence in itself and the trust of the population. By
researching certain particularly heinous events in recent Serbian
and Yugoslav history, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
could, it is submitted, lay the groundwork for prosecutions by
establishing facts that could make judicial action more accept-
able politically and easier legally.9
Having briefly outlined some of the benefits of establishing
a Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a further
question that needs to be answered is-what kind of Commis-
sion? And whose truth should it be seeking to find and whom
9. "Perception of the Truth in Serbia" is the title of a booklet compiling the results
of an opinion poll conducted in Serbia ahead of an international conference organized
by Radio B92 entitled "In Search of Truth and Responsibility-Towards a Democratic
Future" (Belgrade, May 18-20, 2001). The poll was conducted by the Strategic Market-
ing Agency in Belgrade, Central Serbia and Vojvodina in the second half of April 2001
by means of face to face interviews with 2,171 people. The aim of the poll was to find
out what Serbs from Serbia think about the events of the Milosevic era, whom they
believe, and what they are afraid of. The results were startling, to say the least. Accord-
ing to the poll, "Croatian nationalism" was listed as the leading reason for the break-up
of the former Yugoslavia, while Serbian nationalism was ranked last on a list of 14 possi-
ble responses. When asked to name a single event that decisively contributed to the
beginning of the war in the former Yugoslavia, interviewees rated the fact that "the
United States became the sole superpower" above "Milosevic coming to power." More
than half of those polled could not name a single war crime committed by Serbian
forces. When asked to identify whom they thought most responsible for the ex-Yugoslav
wars, interviewees listed former Croatian President Franjo Tudjman ahead of Slobodan
Milosevic and former President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic. The two
most highly ranked individuals in terms of defending Serb interests in the wars that
took place in the last decade of the 20th century are indicted war criminals Ratko
Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, former President and Commander in Chief of the Bos-
nian Serbs. The poll also showed that interviewees more readily believed accounts of
Serb suffering during the Balkan wars than accounts according to which Serbs were
responsible for the suffering of others. Most telling about the need to attempt to pre-
sent the truth was the answer to the following question: "Did any new fact that you
learned about from any source about any event linked to the wars in Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, make you change your mind about the role of the warring par-
ties?" 85.5% of those polled responded negatively, while only 14.5% responded posi-
tively. (Vidjenje istine u Srbiji", za B92 realizovao SMMRI (2001)) (on file with author).
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should it attempt to reconcile? In the Yugoslav case, the answers
are not as simple as they might appear.
According to a leading authority on the subject, truth com-
missions generally share four characteristics. ° They focus on
the past instead of a specific event and attempt to paint the over-
all picture of certain human rights abuses or violations of inter-
national humanitarian law over a period of time. They exist tem-
porarily and cease to operate after the submission of a report.
Truth commissions are usually granted enhanced access to infor-
mation and a greater ability to research sensitive issues, thereby
ensuring impact of their report.1 As will be demonstrated be-
low, the Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission broadly
fits this description, with one important and troubling excep-
tion. Its primary aim will not be to produce an overall picture of
human rights and humanitarian law violations, but an account of
the causes that led to the war(s) in which these violations were
perpetrated. This change in focus can obviously significantly di-
minish its very raison dtre, which is to let the truth be told and to
thus serve as a mechanism in the fight against impunity.
There are also various specific benchmarks that have been
used to evaluate the likelihood of a prospective or current truth
commission's success. For the purposes of this Essay, it is submit-
ted that a commission should,12 first, have a very clear mandate.
There should also be consensus in society that the commission is
needed and that its memberships are appropriate. The commis-
sion's membership should be balanced, representing all political
sectors, so that it will be accepted as an impartial and indepen-
dent authority. The commission's work should be publicized, in-
cluding an announcement of its creation and clarification of its
mandate to the public. The commission should conduct a pro-
fessional, systematic investigation and should have the power to
subpoena witnesses and guarantee their rights and safety. It
should be given the financial resources and staff-in terms of
expertise and number-to allow it to be effective. Its methodol-
10. See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Com-
parative Study, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 597 (1994).
11. Id. at 604.
12. The ensuing list of benchmarks is taken, in a slightly adapted version, from:
Mary Albon, Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance-Documentation of Prior Regimes and Indi-
vidual Rights, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FOR-
MER REGIMES 1 290-91 (NeilJ. Kritz ed., 1995).
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ogy should be calibrated to the specific circumstances at hand so
as to enable it to seek and examine all relevant sources of infor-
mation.
The commission's work should be transparent and its find-
ings should be made public after the expiry of its time-limited
mandate. The commission should seek the cooperation of non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs"), particularly those work-
ing in the human rights field. It should not only document the
past, but also submit evidence of crimes to courts for criminal
prosecutions. It should make system-wide recommendations on
how best to protect human rights in the future. The commission
must also protect the due process rights of identified perpetra-
tors throughout its proceedings. The basic documents of the Yu-
goslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be examined
below with these benchmarks in mind.
A very important question that arises with respect to the Yu-
goslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission is whose "truth" it
should seek to determine. As opposed to most other truth com-
missions to date which dealt with situations of human rights
abuses and/or with violations of international humanitarian law
in situations of internal conflict, the war(s) in the former Yugo-
slavia started out as an internal armed conflict 3 that quickly be-
came internationalized 4 and eventually led to a clear-cut case of
international armed conflict. a5 It is submitted that the Commis-
sion should limit itself to two areas: 1) to examining Serbia's
and the FRY's role and the responsibility of their leaderships for
the crimes perpetrated in the above-mentioned conflicts, and 2)
to examining the human rights abuses committed during the
Milosevic period against the citizens of Serbia and the FRY
within their borders. As will be explained below, any other ap-
proach could, once again, be interpreted as an attempt to im-
pose a Serbian version of the "truth" on others.
Following on that, it is also submitted that the Commission
13. See generally, LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YuGOsLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION
154-64 (1996) (describing Slovenia's 10 day war following its declaration of indepen-
dence).
14. See generally id. at 222-30 (explaining outbreak of war in Bosnia in 1992).
15. Marie-Janine Calic, Kosovo in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Account, in Ko-
SOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECrIVE INDIGNATION,
COLLECrrVE AcrION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 19-31 (Albrecht Schnabel &
Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000) (commenting on background to war in Kosovo).
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should seek to achieve only reconciliation between the various
segments of Serbian and Yugoslav society-minority and groups
belonging to the political opposition for example-who were
victimized during the Milosevic era and those responsible for the
violations against them. While the historical importance and
need for regional, inter-State reconciliation in the Balkans can-
not be overemphasized, it is submitted that what will inevitably
be perceived by others as a Serbian version of the truth cannot
be the foundation of such reconciliation. This would require a
truly regional, inter-State effort, if it is to stand any chance of
success.
II. THE YUGOSLAV TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
A. Method of Establishment and Composition
The Commission was established by means of a presidential
decision issued on March 29, 2001.16 The fairly short text de-
fines the Commission's mandate and lists the nineteen individu-
als initially appointed to its membership,17 of whom four are no
longer members for various reasons.1 '
Comment:
While there was initially some domestic criticism of the fact
that the Commission was established by an act of the President,
rather than Parliament, 9 presidential decrees have historically
been the most common way of creating truth commissions.2 0
Given the balance of power in the current federal legislature
where a number of seats are still held by parties that were in
16. Decision on the Establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ("FRY"), No. 15/2001 (Mar. 30,
2001) [hereinafter Establishment Decision].
17. Id. The 19 initially appointed Commission members are: Radovan Bigovic,
Ljubodrag Dimic, Vojin Dimitrijevic, Slavoljub Djukic, Sulejman Hrnjica, Aleksandar
Lojpur, Bosko Mijatovic, Radmila Nakarada, Predrag Palavestra, Latinka Perovic,
Vladika Sava (Vukovic), Zoran Stankovic, Svetozar Stojanovic, Darko Tanaskovic, Tibor
Varadi, Mirjana Vasovic, Svetlana Velmar-Jankovic, and Mihajlo Vojvodic. Id.
18. Vojin Dimitrijevic and Latinka Perovic have since resigned from the Commis-
sion, Tibor Varadi withdrew due to obligations at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
where he is Chief Legal Adviser, and Vladika Sava (Vukovic) died in the summer of
2001. Vojin Dimitrijevic and Latinka Perovic resigned due to disagreements over the
Commission's mandate.
19. See Lepa Mijic, A Long and Costly Path to the Truth, GLASJAVNOSTI, Aug. 13, 2001,
at 4 (on file with author).
20. See HAYNER, supra note 1, at 291-97.
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power during the Milosevic era, it is, in any event, unlikely that a
commission could have been created by an act of Parliament.
The Commission's composition as listed in the decision is broad-
ranging in so far as it includes representatives of both the nation-
alist and civic political options in Serbia, as well as two members
of ethnic minority groups. However, the Commission could
have benefited from a larger inclusion of other ethnic minority
representatives, members of other religious communities apart
from the Serbian Orthodox Church, NGOs, and professional as-
sociations. It is submitted that the Yugoslav Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission could also have greatly benefited from the
formal appointment to membership of foreign experts, particu-
larly those with previous experience in truth commissions. 21 It
should, in other words, have been a "mixed" body.
The most obvious omission in terms of the Commission's
membership is the absence of any representatives from Monte-
negro, Yugoslavia's other republic. While the reasons have not
been officially explained, they lie in the current uncertainty sur-
rounding the future of the Yugoslav federation.22 It should
therefore be noted that the Commission is, for now, made up
only of members from one of the two federal units and is, there-
fore, not really 'Yugoslav."
B. Mandate
Pursuant to its founding document, the Commission's
"task" is to: 1)"organize research work on the uncovering of evi-
dence on the social, inter-ethnic and political conflicts which led
to the war and to shed light on the causal links among these
events;" 2) "to inform the domestic and international public
about its work and results," and 3) "to achieve cooperation with
21. While Alex Boraine-former Deputy Chair of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and currently President of the New York-based Interna-
tional Center for Transitional Justice-has been appointed permanent advisor to the
Commission, neither he nor any other foreign expert has been named a Commission
member. Alex Boraine Future Permanent Adviser to Truth Commission, BETA NEws AGENCY,
May 16, 2001 (on file with author).
22. Commission member Svetozar Stojanovic recently told the press that the Com-
mission had asked President Kostunica to expand it by appointing two or three more
lawyers, members of other religious communities, and representatives from Montene-
gro. He told GLASJAVNOST that due to elections in Montenegro the President "did not
want to interfere, so that [his appointment] would not be interpreted as pressure." See
Mijic, supra note 19.
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similar commissions and bodies in neighboring countries and
abroad with the aim of exchanging experiences." 23  The presi-
dential decision authorizes the Commission to adopt two addi-
tional documents, drafts of which were presented to the public
to varying degrees: the Commission's Rules of Procedure 24 and
its Basic Program Document.25 They are relevant to an examina-
tion of the Commission's mandate as they further elaborate it.
The Commission's "purpose," according to the draft
Rules, 26 is to "contribute to general reconciliation within the
FRY and with neighboring nations by means of facing the truth
about the conflicts in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via ("SFRY") and the successor states, which caused crimes
against the peace, numerous violations of human rights, of the
law of war and humanitarian law." The Commission shall also
"comprehensively examine and establish the causes and courses
of conflicts which led to the disintegration of the former state
and to the war, causing enormous human sufferings and destruc-
tion in the past decade."27
Under the Commission's draft Program, its purpose is to:
initiate and organize research on: a) the main causes of the
political, economic, social and moral collapse of the SFRY; b)
the wars and other conflicts in the region of the former Yugo-
slavia, which caused great human casualties, ethnic cle-
ansings, displacement, camps, economic damage and destruc-
tion, the destruction of cultural property, the appearance of
dictatorships, the international isolation of the country, and
the general criminalization of society; c) violations of human
rights and violations of international public, humanitarian
23. Establishment Decision, supra note 16 (author's trans.).
24. Draft Rules of Procedure, Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Apr.
2001) [hereinafter Rules] (on file with author). The draft Rules were discussed at a
May 18-20, 2001 international conference held in Belgrade, after participants criticized
the lack of transparency in the initial stages of the Commission's work. Commission
member Aleksandar Lojpur invited all those present, especially non-governmental orga-
nizations ("NGOs"), to submit comments on the draft Rules to the Commission.
25. Draft of Basic Program Document, Commission for Truth and Reconciliation
[hereinafter Program] (on file with author). The draft Program was presented by Com-
mission members at a press conference held in Belgrade on July 31, 2001. Commission
Coordinator Ljubodrag Dimic invited the public to "a dialogue and an exchange of
views" on the draft Program. K. Djordjevic, A Commission With Six Research Teams, POLI-
TIKA, Aug. 1, 2001, at 7.
26. Rules, supra note 24, art. 1(1) (author's trans.).
27. Id. art. 1(2) (author's trans).
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and the law of war.28
The Commission also "intends" to "eliminate many of the
sources and forms of misunderstanding" and to "establish trust
between social groups and peoples" by means of "establishing
the truth.
29
Comment:
From a legal-technical point of view it is rather unusual-
and, it is submitted, confusing-that the Commission's mandate
should be spelled out, each time somewhat differently, in three
different documents. In other words, the clarity of the Commis-
sion's mandate appears blurred because of uncertainty about
which document-and therefore which provisions regulating
the mandate-are controlling. Based on hierarchy of norms
one would have to conclude that the presidential decision has
priority, but no similar differentiation can easily be made be-
tween the draft Rules and Program.3" The need for a distinction
may be illustrated by the draft Rules' explicit recognition that
ccrimes against the peace" constitute a possible avenue of re-
search, whereas no such reference is found in the draft Pro-
gram.3 ' Given that both the Rules and Program are still in draft
form, it is submitted that the texts should be made consistent
from the point of view of legal technique. Provisions on the
Commission's mandate should be removed from the Rules of
Procedure and be further elaborated only in its Basic Program
Document.
A detailed analysis of the way in which the Commission's
mandate is substantively laid out in the three documents is be-
yond the scope of this text.3 2 A few general observations will be
28. Program, supra note 25, at General Provisions, 2 (author's trans.).
29. Id. (author's trans.)
30. It is submitted that the Rules would prevail over the Program-which would in
itself be a source of additional confusion-based on the fact that the Rules must be
approved by the Commission's founder and are to be published in the Official Gazette
of the FRY. See Rules, supra note 24, art. 7(1)(1)(1).
31. The Program makes no explicit reference to "crimes against the peace," unless
its mention of violations of "international public ... law" is meant to be read as a
synonym, which would require an impossibly bold interpretive leap.
32. In his resignation letter to President Kostunica, Professor Vojin Dimitrijevic
gave several reasons for declining membership, including the Commission's very broad
geographic and temporal mandate. He also specified: "There are many causes of war,
but the rules of humanitarian law are one, and they must be respected by both the
attacker and the attacked in armed conflict. As may be guessed, it is the bestiality in our
wars that I am most interested in as a lawyer. However, the Commission is expected to
20011
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offered instead. The first, and most troubling conclusion that
one reaches after an even cursory reading of the mandate provi-
sions, is that the Commission's primary aim is to look into the
causes and course of the armed conflicts that took place in the
former Yugoslavia, and not into the unspeakable violations of in-
ternational law that were perpetrated as those conflicts were un-
folding. This is a departure from the mandates of most previous
truth commissions, whose main goal was precisely to identify vio-
lations and, depending on commission set-up, those responsible
for them. The Yugoslav Commission's reversal of focus to causes
of violence instead of its consequences robs the Commission of
its very raison d'etre-to tell the truth about victims and perpetra-
tors. While establishing the background to violations is impor-
tant, context must not be allowed to erase the faces and grief of
those whose suffering was, so often in the Balkans, justified by
calls to "historical duty." While historical research must, in sum,
be an important part of the Commission's work, it should not be
its main goal.
The second problem with the Commission's mandate as
currently defined is that it obviously aims to look into the causes
of the former Yugoslavia's disintegration as a whole, which
greatly expands the scope, feasibility, and political import of its
work. It is difficult to imagine how a Commission based in one
of the five countries that came out of the SFRY's collapse can
hope to objectively assess-and present the "truth"-on events
about which each of the five States continue to have differing
views. Could the Yugoslav Truth Commission hope to, for exam-
ple, objectively pass judgment on the reasons for Slovenia's push
for independence? And, is the Commission competent to make
a determination about responsibility for crimes against the
peace, acts which the international community is still struggling
to define from the point of view of individual criminal responsi-
establish great truths: I am afraid of Great Truths because it is in their name and with
the aim of their expansion that cruel violence has been inflicted. Reconciliation can be
commenced by much more modest means. For its purposes, establishing intent, or who
was right or wrong, or whose behavior can be explained and understood (and maybe
justified) is not important. What is important is who was human and who was inhu-
man." Vojin Dimitrijevic, Open letter to Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, DANAS, Apr. 18, 2001, at 6
(author's trans.). In her resignation letter, Latinka Perovic said that the Commission's
"mandate is not clear, but [the Commission] is firmly institutionalized, whereby a
framework within which the truth can be sought has already been established." FRY
Truth Commission, BETA NEWS, Apr. 17, 2001 (author's trans.).
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bility?3" How could a one-sided identification of the perpetra-
tor(s) of such crimes, if that were possible, be beneficial to rec-
onciliation if the other State parties rejected it? These are, rela-
tively speaking, easier questions. Attempting to comprehensively
and objectively portray the views of all sides in the Croatian and
Bosnian wars would be almost impossible.
There is also the related problem of how the Yugoslav Com-
mission will access documents and witnesses in the territories of
other States that might, as yet, be unwilling to share evidence
essential to its research. It is submitted, therefore, that one ave-
nue of the Commission's work should be research and investiga-
tion of Serbia's and the FRYs contribution to the start of the
Balkan wars and, above all, the responsibility of their leaderships
for the serious violations that were committed during those
armed conflicts (1991-99). While this would still present obsta-
cles in terms of access to evidence and witnesses in neighboring
countries, requests for access might be more readily granted if
the Commission's mandate were less sweeping than it currently
is. The Commission's aim should be, in other words, to take a
hard look at Serbia and Yugoslavia. Any broader conclusions
must be left to a regional, inter-State truth-telling initiative,
which the Commission could encourage as one of its recommen-
dations.
A second avenue of the Commission's work should be to
examine and investigate the human rights abuses committed
against the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro during the
Milosevic period. As is well-known, his regime produced no end
of assassinations, disappearances, torture, and other crimes
against members of opposition political parties and minority
groups. The Commission should have far fewer problems inves-
tigating these and other abuses in terms of access to victims, wit-
nesses, and evidence.
33. The crime of aggression was included in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, but was not defined. A Preparatory Commission that meets periodi-
cally at U.N. headquarters in New York is still attempting to draft a widely acceptable
definition of this crime for the purposes of establishing individual criminal responsibil-
ity. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998), art. 5(2), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/, reprinted in Roy LEE, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 481-482 (1999).
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C. Method of Work
The Commission's draft Rules of Procedure provide that
the Commission "shall organize research on the state crisis and
on the social conflicts which led to the war. The Commission
shall endeavor to clarify the causal links between the events
which are the subject of the research."34 The draft document
adds that the Commission "shall seek to establish cooperation
with similar commissions and bodies, governmental and non-
governmental organizations in neighboring countries, as well as
with international inter-governmental and non-governmental or-
ganizations and bodies."35 The draft also provides that the Com-
mission will establish working groups and that its Coordinator,
or the working groups, may decide to engage "experts, or expert
teams, institutes, and NGOs," for certain aspects of the re-
search.36 These bodies are designated as "accessory."37 The
draft Rules do not mention public hearings or witness testimony,
nor do they refer to cooperation with the ICTY, which is, fortu-
nately, rectified by the draft Program.
As already noted, the draft Basic Program Document also
provides that the Commission's mandate is to be carried out by
means of "initiating and organizing research."38 It specifies that
the Commission "cooperates with all governmental and non-gov-
ernmental organizations that have relevant documentation and
deal with the problems involved, which includes cooperation
with domestic and international experts."3 The Commission
also deems that "dialogue with the international community...
including the ICTY," as well as with other similar institutions at
home and in the vicinity (the region of the former SFRY), are
"absolutely necessary" and constitute "one of its main tasks."4
According to the draft Program, the Commission's work will go
34. Rules, supra note 24, art. 2(1) (author's trans.).
35. Id. art. 2(3) (author's trans.).
36. Id. art. 4(4) and (5) (author's trans.). The draft Rules also provide that one of
the Commission's members shall be designated Coordinator, charged with organizing
its work. Id. art. 4(1). A Rapporteur shall also be chosen from among Commission
members on a six-month basis. The Rapporteur will represent the Commission in con-
tacts with the public, government bodies, international organizations, and other organi-
zations and bodies. Id. art. 4(2).
37. Id. art. 4(5) (author's trans.).
38. Program, supra note 25, at General Provisions, 1 2 (author's trans.).
39. Id. 1 5 (author's trans.).
40. Id. (author's trans.).
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through several phases: it will first "take stock of existing materi-
als and information," then "collect first-hand materials and wit-
ness testimony," "identify the main controversies,... analyze the
entire material," and "present the results."4 1
The draft Program also specifies that the Commission will
create "research teams" that will focus on: "1) scientific and ex-
pert research, and 2) talks with participants of events (high-pro-
file political actors, organizers, perpetrators, witnesses, and vic-
tims of crime, soldiers, policemen, those who incited conflict,
and others). '' 42 The Commission and its research teams "shall
commence" work in six working groups, devoted to research on:
a) "the key historical events and processes 1980-2000, b) viola-
tions of human rights and violations of humanitarian and the
law of war, c) socio-psychological factors, d) the role of the relig-
ious factor, e) the role of public opinion and the media, and f)
the influence of foreign factors."43 Each working group is au-
thorized to further define its "area and methodology of work
and to appoint associates."" Finally, the draft Program stipu-
lates that the Commission "shall organize public discussions,
hearings and testimony"4"
Comment:
The Commission's method of work is, once again, to be
found in two documents with overlapping, but not identical pro-
visions, which makes it rather difficult to gauge how it will in fact
be carried out. It is clear, however, that the focus is on research
rather than on investigation and on creating a historical record
rather than on documenting crimes. This is evident from the
fact that only one of the six envisaged working groups will be
dealing with violations of human rights and international hu-
manitarian law, whereas all the rest will be devoted to presenting
the "bigger picture." It is not clear what the temporal scope of
the groups will be, i.e., whether only the first group (historical
events and processes) will research the last two decades of the
past century or whether the others will adopt the same time-
frame. It is submitted that examining the history of the former
SFRY from Tito's death (1980) until the beginning of the war in
41. Rules, supra note 24, at Method of Work, 3 (author's trans.).
42. Id. 4 (author's trans.).
43. Id. 5 (author's trans.).
44. Rules, supra note 24, art. 4(5) (author's trans.).
45. Id. at Organization of Work, 7 (author's trans.).
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Slovenia (1991) is unnecessary for understanding the atrocities
committed after 1991, given that history-even one of past griev-
ances-can never be used to justify present-day crimes. It is also
unclear why two separate groups should be devoted to examin-
ing the role of the religious factor (the SFRY was a communist
country where expressions of religious fervor were not particu-
larly tolerated) and to foreign influence in the conflicts, respec-
tively. The creation of the latter is, in particular, an uncomforta-
ble indication of the direction of the Commission's inquiry, one
that suggests an inability to come to terms with the fact that
crimes committed in the Balkans were home grown. The subject
matter of these two groups could well be folded into the first and
their resources freed up for use by the other groups (it is also
unclear what exactly the group on "socio-psychological factors"
is meant to address.)
While the Commission's intended reliance on direct evi-
dence, such as that which can be provided by victims and wit-
nesses, and from public testimony, is commendable, the extent
to which the Commission will make use of them remains to be
seen. In the event that testimony is extensively used, which is to
be hoped, proper measures for victim and witness protection will
need to be put in place. The same applies to alleged perpetra-
tors, as regards their due process rights. The final versions of
the Commission's Rules would also need to specify what its pow-
ers of subpoena will be, if any. It is also assumed that the Com-
mission will develop other internal documents regulating essen-
tial issues such as the security of its archives, documentation,
data base management, etc.
While it is encouraging that the Commission's draft Pro-
gram envisages "dialogue" with the ICTY, it is also to be hoped
that the relationship between these two institutions will be more
clearly defined going forward. The Commission need not dupli-
cate the Tribunal's work in creating a historical record and it is
to expected that its conclusions about the role and responsibility
of domestic actors will not significantly differ from the ICTY's.
The Commission's final report could, in fact, indirectly assist the
ICTY by providing it with additional information on patterns of
violations and who was behind them.
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D. Transparency
The presidential decision establishing the Commission spec-
ifies that one of its tasks is to "inform the domestic and interna-
tional public about its work and results."46
The Commission's draft Rules provide that the Commission
"shall keep the public informed about the results of its work"4 7
and that this shall be done by means of the Commission Rap-
porteur's press conferences, as well as through periodic reports,
and reports.48 According to the draft Rules, the Rapporteur
shall hold a press conference after each Commission meeting in
order to inform the public about its work.4 9 As for periodic re-
ports, the Commission shall "publish collections of works
presenting the results of research work carried out by the Com-
mission, its working groups, and expert teams."' The Commis-
sion shall also "prepare and publish reports which will provide a
clear and synthesized overview of its work, as well as that of its
working groups and expert teams."51
The Commission's draft Program supplements the Rules in
so far as it provides that "the Commission's work is public. ' 52 It
adds that the Commission shall hold regular press conferences,
that its members shall maintain regular contacts with the me-
dia ,5 and that it shall "critically publish relevant documentation
and thus present it to the broad public. ' 54 At the end of its man-
date the Commission shall, "by means of a report, inform the
public about the results of its entire research and convey its rec-
46. See Establishment Decision, supra note 16.
47. Rules, supra note 24, art. 2(2) (author's trans.).
48. Id. art. 6(l)-(3) (author's trans.).
49. Id. art. 6(1) (author's trans.).
50. Id. art. 6(2) (author's trans.).
51. Id. art. 6(3) (author's trans.). The draft Rules also provide for the publication
of a separate opinion by "a Commission member or a group of members" on "an issue"
dealt with in the "Commission's Report". Id. art. 6(4) (author's trans.). The phrasing
leads to the conclusion that this option applies only to the Commission's final report
even though the draft Rules do not mention a final report (it is, however, mentioned in
the draft Program, as will be cited below), nor do they provide for its method of adop-
tion. Thus, it could happen that the Commission's final report is adopted with separate
opinions attached to different segments of the text. This is a troubling possibility from
the point of view of the final report's effect and credibility.
52. Program, supra note 25, at General Provisions, 4 (author's trans.).
53. Id. at Organization of Work, 6 (author's trans.).
54. Id. 8 (author's trans.).
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ommendations to the government. ' 55 As already mentioned, the
Commission will also "organize public talks, hearings and testi-
mony. 5
6
Comment:
It is encouraging that the texts cited above reflect an evolu-
tion in the Commission's approach to the transparency of work.
While the presidential decision speaks only of informing the do-
mestic and international public of the Commission's work and
results, the draft Rules and Program further elaborate the ways
in which the public will be kept informed. The difference be-
tween the three types of reports mentioned in the documents,
however, is not clear-periodic reports, Commission reports,
and final report-and it is to be hoped that the Commission will
clarify this going forward. The documents also fail to sufficiently
differentiate between publicizing the progress of the Commis-
sion's work, its results (press conferences, reports) and the pub-
licity of its actual proceedings. While there is a general state-
ment that the Commission's work is "public" and that public
talks, hearings, and testimony will be held, there is no further
elaboration of the extent to which public proceedings will be
part of the Commission's work. Given that the persons indicted
for crimes under international law are already being tried before
the ICTY in public hearings, it is submitted that there is no rea-
son not to make use of public hearings, unless victim and witness
protection demand otherwise.
E. Time-Frame
The Commission's draft Rules provide that it
shall endeavor to complete its work as soon as possible, and
no later than three years from the date of adoption of these
Rules. If the Commission fails to complete its work in the
above-mentioned period, it shall continue operating until its
completion, unless the Commission or its founder adopts a
decision terminating the Commission's work and dissolving it
after the expiry of the above-mentioned period.57
The draft Program only says that "the Commission shall en-
55. Id. 9 (author's trans.).
56. Id. 7(author's trans.).
57. Rules, supra note 24, art. 7(4) (author's trans.).
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deavor to complete its work in three years."58
Comment:
Contrary to most other truth commissions, which were
given between six months and a year to finish their investigations
and present a report,59 the Yugoslav Commission will have an
unusually long life-span. This is probably due to its focus on
broad-ranging research, rather than on investigation of viola-
tions, which, as already submitted, will greatly diminish its truth-
telling function. While there is no doubt that a short time-frame
puts great pressure on Commissioners and their staff, the rea-
sons in favor of brevity are considerable-the aim is to present a
final report while
there is still a momentum of transition under way, when a
spirit of reconciliation may still be in the air and recom-
mended reforms are more likely to be implemented. A truth
commission cannot hope to document or investigate every-
thing that falls within its mandate; it must choose a few sam-
ple cases for investigation and only summarize the rest.6 °
It seems likely that the Yugoslav Commission's three-year
time-frame will reduce the impact of its report and therefore de-
value the work that will have preceded it. Moreover, when one
has in mind that the three-year period has not started running
yet (it starts with the adoption of the draft Rules), it may be con-
cluded that much valuable time has been lost already. Just as
troubling is the draft Rules' suggestion that the Commission
might not finish work within a three-year period, as reiterated in
the draft Program. The tentativeness of the texts points to the
worrisome possibility that the job will not get done on time.
F. Funding and Staff
The draft Rules provide that the Commission will be State
funded but can also accept donations,61 while the draft Program
specifies that the Commission "shall dispose of its own budget."62
As regards staff, the draft Program provides that the Commission
and its research teams "shall be assisted by permanently em-
58. Program, supra note 25, at Organization of Work, 3 (author's trans.).
59. See HAYNER, supra note 1, at 222-23.
60. Id. at 222.
61. Rules, supra note 24, art. 5 (1) (author's trans.). Donations must, however, be
approved by the Commission's Coordinator and the President's office.
62. Program, supra note 25, at Organization of Work, 2 (author's trans.).
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ployed staff."6 3 The Commission will, as previously mentioned,
be able to engage "experts or expert teams, institutes and
NGOs ' 6 to carry out certain segments of the research, to be
paid out of the Commission's budget.65 The Commission's Sec-
retary is also a permanent employee, drawn from the President's
office .66
Comment:
While provisions on the Commission's methods of funding
and staff, rudimentary as they are, seem adequate, the reality is
that neither funding nor staff were put in place by the middle of
August 2001.67 The Commission still had no office space or
phone.68 According to Commission members, the President's
office had assured them that the necessary conditions for work
would be created by the end of the month.69 As of this writing,
at the end of September 2001, no change in the situation had
been reported. There is no doubt that providing proper fund-
ing and staff for the Commission will be difficult given the cur-
rent economic situation in the country. If, however, there is a
genuine will to see the Commission's mandate through, a way
must be found. An obvious option would be to follow the exam-
ple of some other truth commissions and seek donations from
abroad.7°
G. Miscellaneous Issues
The Commission's draft Program provides that, along with
the submission of a final report, recommendations will be made
63. Id. 4 (author's trans.).
64. Rules, supra note 24, art. 5 (author's trans.).
65. Id. (author's trans.).
66. Id. art. 4(3) (author's trans.).
67. Mjic, supra note 19.
68. Id.
69. According to Commission member Svetozar Stojanovic: "This slow start is not
the result of action by Commission members, but is due to the fact that it has not
received money, office space or administrative staff. A decision on this must be taken
by the federal government. The previous government has fallen, the new one has just
been constituted and we expect that it will take a decision shortly. We asked the Presi-
dent's office and have been promised that this will be done by the end of the month
[Aug. 2001]." Id. Stojanovic pointed out that despite lack of funding, premises, and
staff, Commission members had worked on drafting the Basic Program document and
had been in touch with Commission adviser Alex Boraine.
70. See HAYNER, supra note 1, at 223-24.
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to the government.71 However, none of the documents reviewed
above mention the relationship between the Commission's work
and future domestic trials for violations of human rights or inter-
national humanitarian law, nor do they authorize the Commis-
sion to examine redress to victims.
Comment:
Even though the draft Program envisages that recommenda-
tions will be made to the government by the Commission, it is
difficult to make any assessment about their possible direction
given the research rather than investigative focus of the Commis-
sion's work. Where truth commissions have dealt primarily with
documenting abuses and violations, it has been easier to provide
specific guidance on changes that should be made in the area of
administration ofjustice, reform of the armed forces and police,
political reforms, prosecutions of perpetrators, redress to vic-
tims, etc., 72 as a means of ensuring that crimes will not be re-
peated. It is hoped that the Commission's openness to witness
testimony and other sources of direct evidence, even though
only hesitantly reflected in the draft Program, will similarly lead
to specific recommendations for reform and follow-up.
It is also submitted that the Yugoslav Commission must clar-
ify its relationship to potential domestic trials for violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law. The Com-
mission cannot be, nor should it be, a substitute judicial body,
but it should redefine its mandate so as to contribute to account-
ability for perpetrators. There are several possible options-
from naming names, recommending non-penal sanctions (such
as removal from public office), to passing on files to prosecutors
where the evidence warrants it. If the Commission were to focus
on documenting violations it could provide the much needed
impetus for domestic trials, especially as the Yugoslav criminal
justice system obliges prosecutors to open investigations into acts
such as murder and torture, war crimes, or crimes against hu-
manity ex officio. Its recommendations should provide specific
guidance to the government on follow-up that could be taken by
means of the judicial system.
The same need for clarification of the Commission's man-
date exists as regards redress to victims, which can take several
71. Program, supra note 25, at Organization of Work, 9 (author's trans.).
72. See t-AvNER, supra note 1, at 306-13.
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forms. While it is not suggested that the Commission itself
should practically deal with this issue, its recommendations
should outline the options for further government action.
CONCLUSION
While it is commendable that a national Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission was created in Yugoslavia last spring, its op-
eration needs to be properly set up. Truth commissions can be
an important mechanism in strengthening accountability for vio-
lations of international and domestic law only if their mandate
permits them to play a truth-telling role. The Yugoslav Commis-
sion's focus on research rather than on documenting violations,
as well as its wide geographic and temporal scope, risk trans-
forming it into a body that will essentially be (re)writing history.
There are other, more qualified institutions that could perform
that task and no other institution within Yugoslavia that could
take on the Commission's role. Its mandate should therefore be
clarified and streamlined to provide the Commission with the
substantive and procedural authority needed by a truth-telling
body aimed at enhancing accountability and contributing to rec-
onciliation. To this end, the Commission should generate broad
public discussion and seek the views of all groups and individu-
als, both at home and abroad, who could assist it in defining its
mandate and method of work going forward.
The political will and concrete backing of the government is
also crucial to the successful completion of the Commission's
task. If the requisite will for an honest and impartial look at the
past is lacking, then the Commission's work could result in
harming, rather than helping truth-telling and the process of
reconciliation. A Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion that fairly quickly presents a credible report on violations,
their victims, and the perpetrators is essential not only domesti-
cally, but more widely as well. It could facilitate truth-telling in
other countries of the region and would hopefully facilitate the
creation of an inter-State truth and reconciliation commission
which, it is submitted, should be the next step.
